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Abstract
In an eort to explain the observed heterogeneity in the exporting decisions of rms,
the empirical trade literature has concluded that exporting rms are more productive
than non-exporting rms. In this paper, I show that the foundation for this conclusion
is weak, given that the productivity estimates used in the literature suer from several
sources of potential bias. I apply a new method for estimating production functions to
control for these sources of bias. Using data on manufacturing rms in Colombia, I nd
that, while the measures of productivity used in the literature imply that exporters are
more productive, once I correct for the bias, there is no correlation between productivity and export status. This result is inconsistent with productivity being the main
determinant of entry into export markets, and suggests the importance of other sources
of heterogeneity in explaining rm-level exporting decisions.
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1 Introduction
As rm-level data on exports has become available, an interest in understanding the causes
of the observed heterogeneity in exporting decisions has developed in the empirical trade
literature. One common observation in the data is that, even within narrowly dened industries, only a small percentage of rms export. This suggests the existence of some source
of rm-level heterogeneity that causes certain rms to export while other rms do not. The
literature has found that exporting rms tend to be better in the sense that they sell more
output, hire more workers, are more capital intensive, and are more productive. This last
nding has become almost a stylized fact in the literature. As a consequence, the literature
has focused on productivity as a key determinant of export status, and has worked to develop models of exporting that can replicate this positive correlation between exporting and
productivity.
In this paper, I show that the evidence for the conclusion that exporters are more productive is weak, as the underlying estimates of productivity suer from several sources of
potential bias. As opposed to characteristics such as the number of workers or the amount
of capital, productivity is not directly observable and has to be recovered from the data. I
show that there are several reasons to believe that the measures of productivity commonly
used in the literature are biased. First, the use of value-added specications of production
ignores the role of intermediate inputs. Second, a rm's output is typically only measured
in revenues as opposed to quantities. Failing to properly control for these unobserved prices
leads to biased estimates of productivity. The third source of bias arises due to the common
approach of measuring productivity as the residual from a regression of output on inputs.
When a rm's input choices are correlated with its productivity shocks, then this causes an
endogeneity problem that leads to biased estimates of productivity.
In this paper, I show that the standard methods for controlling for these sources of
bias cannot be applied in this setting with exporting rms.

As a solution, I develop a

new approach for estimating production functions that accounts for exporting rms. This
approach is based on the method introduced in Gandhi, Navarro, and Rivers (2009). Using
data on Colombian manufacturing rms, I nd that the measures of productivity used in
the literature over-estimate the productivity advantage of exporting rms relative to nonexporting rms. In fact, after controlling for the sources of bias contained in the commonly
used measures, I nd no dierence in productivity based on export status.
This lack of correlation between productivity and export status is inconsistent with a
model in which heterogeneity in productivity is the primary determinant of export status,
and is suggestive of the existence of alternative drivers of exporting decisions. Additional
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justication for this comes from the fact that export intensitiesthe fraction of output
that a rm exportsexhibit high variance in the data and are highly correlated over time.
Since this cannot be explained by dierences in productivity, this suggests the presence of
an additional source of rm-specic heterogeneity that is both persistent and related to
exporting decisions. I show that this heterogeneity, which is recoverable from the data, can
enter the model through dierences in the marginal costs and marginal benets of exporting.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I review the related literature
on exporting and productivity. In Section 3, I discuss the potential sources of bias in the
measures of productivity used in the literature. In Section 4, I compute the two commonly
used measures of productivity using data on Colombian manufacturing rms, and I discuss
the eect of using value-added as opposed to gross output specications of production. In
Section 5, I present a method to control for unobserved prices that accounts for the fact
that rms sell output both domestically and abroad. In Section 6, I introduce a new method
for estimating production functions that both controls for endogeneity due to unobserved
productivity and allows for gross output specications of the production function. Section 7
presents the estimating model that results from assembling all of the components (controlling
for exporting, prices, endogeneity of inputs, and gross output specications). In Section 8,
I describe the data, present the empirical results, and discuss the implications for models of
exporting. Section 9 concludes.

2 Related Literature on Exporting and Productivity
There are many empirical papers that examine the relationship between rm-level productivity and export status. Most nd evidence of a positive correlation between the two. This
has prompted a debate as to the cause of this correlation.

In a survey of this literature,

covering 45 papers and 33 countries, Wagner (2007) notes that the majority of the literature
supports the hypothesis of self-selection resulting from the presence of xed costs of entry
into export markets. These xed costs include identifying and informing potential foreign
customers, learning about relevant foreign laws and standards, and forming relationships
with distributors. Only the most productive rms nd the export market suciently profitable to justify paying these xed costs of exporting, which generates a positive correlation
between exporting and productivity. Bernard and Jensen (1999), Clerides, Lach, and Tybout
(1998), and Aw, Chung, and Roberts (2000) are the most frequently cited empirical papers
in support of this view.
The theoretical foundation for the hypothesis of self-selection is formalized in Melitz
(2003). Melitz presents a model with heterogeneous rms and analyzes the eects of intra-

3

industry trade. Each rm produces a dierent variety of a good in a monopolistically competitive setting.

One implication of this model is that, in the presence of xed costs of

exporting, opening the economy to trade induces only the most productive rms to select
into exporting.

(In the absence of xed costs of exporting, all rms would export in this

model.)
An alternative hypothesis in the literature is that the causation runs in the other direction
that the act of exporting causes increases in rm-level productivity through learning. Exporting rms learn from international trading partners and competitors and use this knowledge
to increase their productivity.

Although this hypothesis has received less support in the

literature, some papers nd evidence of learning, particularly in developing countries. Both
De Loecker (2007) for Slovenia and Van Biesebroeck (2006) for sub-Saharan Africa nd evidence that rm-level productivity increased subsequent to exporting, which supports the
learning hypothesis.
Finally, Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) (henceforth BEJK) suggests a third
explanation.

In BEJK, geographic barriers, which include transportation costs, language

barriers, and taris, generate heterogeneous marginal costs of exporting. Within each variety
of a product, rms compete under Bertrand competition and there are no xed costs of
exporting. Since domestic rms do not face these geographic barriers, in order for a foreign
rm to successfully export, it must be able to price more competitively than the domestic
rms in the destination country.

This implies that, on average, exporting rms are more

productive than non-exporting rms.

3 Measures of Productivity
The majority of the empirical trade literature deals with the issue of rm-level productivity
being unobservable in one of two ways. First, productivity is approximated by labor productivity, which can usually be measured directly in the data as the ratio of output (measured by
either deated revenues or real value added) to labor input (measured by either real wages,
workers, or hours). In addition to being directly observable, the use of labor productivity
has the advantage of not requiring data on capital levels, functional form assumptions on
the production function, or the estimation of a production function.

The main disadvan-

tage of this approach is that labor productivity does not reect true productivity dierences
among rms. Labor productivity, by construction, is a function of the other inputs. It is
also endogenous as both output and labor input are chosen by the rm. In response to these
disadvantages, many papers in the literature also attempt to recover measures of total factor
productivity (TFP). Consider a generic production function
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F (K, L, M ),

where

K

denotes

capital,

L

denotes labor, and

M

denotes intermediate inputs.

The amount of output,

Q,

that a rm produces is given by the following expression:

Q = A × F (K, L, M ) ,
where

A

(1)

1

denotes TFP.

A common approach in the literature is to measure TFP as the residual from a linear
regression of the log of real value added on the log of capital and labor. However, there are
several reasons to believe that estimates of productivity generated using this method are
biased, as I explain in what follows.
A lengthy literature in industrial organization is focused on estimating production functions and TFP. The primary concern in this literature, introduced by Marschak and Andrews
(1944), is that if the rm's input decisions respond to productivity shocks, then input levels
will be correlated with unobserved productivity, leading to an endogeneity bias. This is often
referred to as the transmission bias or simultaneity bias.
A second issue, also rst suggested by Marschak and Andrews (1944), but not addressed
until more recently by Klette and Griliches (1996), arises because in most datasets the output
price and quantity are not observed separately. Rather, only revenues are observed. Since
revenues are the only measure of output, unobserved prices are also present in the error term.
If a rm's input choices are correlated with its output price, then an additional potential
endogeneity problem arises, called the omitted price bias. Moreover, even if there was not
an omitted price bias, the residual would still contain both productivity and price, so the
resulting measure of productivity would be confounded with unobserved prices.
A third issue is the use of value-added specications of the production function as opposed to gross output specications. This has received much less attention in the literature.
Nominal value added, VA, is dened as the dierence between the value of output (revenue)
and the value of intermediate inputs:

VA
where

P

is the price of output and


= (P × Q) − P M × M ,
PM

2

is the price of intermediate inputs.

Value added can

then be written as a function of the primary inputs of capital and labor,

1 This measure of productivity captures Hicks-neutral dierences in the eciency of rms. If rm 1 has
a TFP that is twice that of rm 2, then with the same amount of inputs, rm 1 can produce twice as much
output as rm 2.

2 Real value added is calculated by deating nominal value added directly or by deating revenue and the

value of intermediate inputs separately with dierent deators (double-deated value added).
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VA
where

e × Fe (K, L) ,
=A

(2)

e is the value-added approximation
Fe (•) is the value-added production function and A

to TFP.
The use of value added as a measure of output is popular for a number of reasons.
First, value added can be aggregated to measure the total output of an industry or set
of industries without double-counting intermediate inputs to production. Second, a valueadded production function relates output to labor and capital (but not intermediate inputs),
which results in fewer parameters to estimate.

Third, the recent structural methods for

recovering productivity via the estimation of a production function cannot, in general, handle
gross output specications.

The reason is that these methods of Olley and Pakes (1996),

Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), and Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2006) cannot generally
identify coecients on intermediate inputs.

As a result, intermediate inputs have to be

subtracted out, and a value-added specication used.
A problem with value added is that it is not the natural measure of the output of the
technology of a rm. A rm transforms inputs (including intermediate inputs) into output.
Without intermediate inputs, output cannot be produced. In addition, by subtracting out
the value of intermediate inputs, value added ignores any potential substitution between
intermediate inputs and the primary inputs of capital and labor.
In addition to concerns about value added as a concept, the value-added specication
is generally not a valid approximation to the gross output specication. Bruno (1978) and
Basu and Fernald (1995, 1997) show that there is a limited and restrictive set of conditions
under which the parameters of a value-added production function correspond to those of a
gross output production function. In particular, Basu and Fernald (1995, 1997) show that
when the assumptions of perfect competition and constant returns to scale are violated,
the parameters of the value-added specication do not correspond to those of the gross
output specication. Since many of the recent theoretical models of trade involve imperfect
competition and increasing returns to scale, this seems especially problematic.
An additional reason for preferring a gross output specication derives from the literature
that attempts to deal with the omitted price bias. When prices are unobserved, and output
is only measured in revenues, demand has to be modeled in order to control for prices.
The problem is that the concept of demand for value added is generally not meaningful.
Consumers have demand for nal products, and do not care about how much value the rm
added to the product.
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4 Value-Added versus Gross Output Specications
In this section, I rst replicate the empirical nding that exporters are more productive than
non-exporters. Using a dataset on Colombian manufacturing rms, I compute the two most
commonly used measures of productivity in the literature. The data are described in more
detail in Section 8.

For each 3-digit industry, I compute labor productivity as real value
3

added divided by the number of hours worked.

Following the empirical trade literature, I

also estimate TFP as the residual from an OLS regression of real value added on capital and
hours worked:

vajt = αljt + βkjt + νjt ,
where

vajt

is the log of the real value added of rm

log capital, and the residual
4

(2)).

νjt

j

in period

(3)

t, ljt

is log labor,

is log TFP (which is equal to the log of

e
A

kjt

is

from equation

I then calculate the productivity premia of exporters as the percentage dierence in

average productivity between exporting and non-exporting rms. I report these productivity
premia in Table 1. The results are consistent with the literature. Exporting rms appear
more productive than non-exporting rms in almost all industries, and in many cases the
dierences are large. In most cases, the premium is higher for labor productivity, which is
reective of the fact that exporters are on average 7 times larger in terms of capital stocks.
As opposed to labor productivity, the concept of TFP captures true eciency dierences
across rms. However, estimates of TFP based on value-added may not reect true productivity dierences due to the strong restrictions underlying the approximation. In order to
examine the empirical relevance of using value-added, I re-estimate TFP by replacing the
value-added specication in equation (3) with the following equation for real gross output:

gojt = aljt + bkjt + cmjt + µjt ,
where

gojt

is the deated value of log gross output and the residual

equal to the log of

A from equation (1)).

(4)

µjt

is log TFP (which is

The resulting productivity premia are presented in

Table 2. As Table 2 illustrates, the productivity premia based on estimates of TFP from a
gross output specication tell a signicantly dierent story than the other two measures. In
most cases the premium based on gross output is smaller than its value-added counterpart,
and in several cases it is negative. The disparate results yielded by the value-added and gross
output specications provide evidence that the value-added specication is not a good approximation to the gross output specication. Furthermore, the gross output results provide

3 In the data, rms are classied by industry according to the ISIC Rev. 2 classication.
4 Throughout this paper I will use lower-case letters to denote logs and upper-case letters to denote levels.
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much weaker evidence for a systematic relationship between exporting and productivity, and
call into question the conclusion that dierences in productivity are the primary driver of
5

exporting decisions.

While using gross output specications addresses the problem of using meaningful measures of output when recovering productivity, the exercise is far from complete. As described
earlier, I still need to control for the biases caused by unobserved prices and unobserved productivity. I address each of these separately in the next two sections. As a consequence of
the results described above, I will use gross output specications for the remainder of my
analysis.

5 Controlling for Unobserved Prices
In empirical work on production function and productivity estimation, it is often assumed
that output measured in quantities can be observed directly. However, in most datasets we
do not observe quantities (or prices) but instead observe only revenues.

To see why this

introduces further complications, notice that the log of revenue can be expressed as follows:

rjt = ln (F (Kjt , Ljt , Mjt )) + ωjt + pjt ,
where

pjt

is output price and

ωjt

is log TFP. The typical solution in the literature is to use

price deators to transform revenues into quantities. The problem with this approach is that
6

rm-specic price deators are typically not available.
the rm's price and the price deator,

pjt − pt ,

Therefore, the dierence between

remains in the error term,

rjt − pt = ln (F (Kjt , Ljt , Mjt )) + ωjt + (pjt − pt ) .
If rms possess any market power, then deating with an aggregate price index will lead
to biased estimates of the production function and, consequently, biased estimates of rmlevel productivity. The reason is that

pjt − pt

reects a rm's market power, which is likely

correlated with input demands, leading to endogeneity. This is known as the omitted price
bias.

Moreover, even if endogeneity was not a concern, there is a more obvious source of

bias in the productivity estimates themselves: they will be the sum of true productivity
and unobserved price deviations

(pjt − pt ).

(ωjt )

Consequently, controlling for unobserved prices

5 The fact that the gross output specication weakens the apparent relationship between productivity and
export status is illustrative of a larger problem. The widespread use of value-added production functions in
the broader literature may be resulting in biased conclusions to other questions which rely on estimating a
production function.

6 See Marschak and Andrews (1944) and, for a more recent treatment, Klette and Griliches (1996).
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will be important for both reasons.
In the absence of data on prices, solving this problem requires modeling demand (and
therefore prices). One option is to use a single constant-elasticity residual demand curve.

7

However, when some rms export, these rms not only sell their goods domestically, but also
abroad. As a result, the use of a single demand function to model prices will not be sucient
to measure the price of the rm's output, as the average price received by the rm is a
weighted average of the domestic and foreign prices. In fact, using a single demand system
will

over-estimate

the relative productivity advantage of exporting rms. The intuition for

this can be seen in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Inferring Price and Quantity from a Single Demand

Suppose that we observe a rm earning total revenues R. By ignoring the foreign market

Q and price P (Q) are inferred.8 Given
implied prots are Π (Q) = R − C (Q).

and using a single domestic demand curve, a quantity
a function for the costs of production,

C (Q),

the

If that rm is exporting some of its output, and there are any costs of exporting, then the

Π (Q). In
C (Q). Under

rm must be making a higher prot (excluding these costs of exporting) than
order for prots to be higher, the costs of production must be lower than

the assumption that the cost function is strictly increasing in quantity, this implies that the
total quantity (across both markets) being produced by the exporting rm is

e < Q.
Q

As a

result, since the model over-estimates the quantity that this exporting rm is producing, it
will over-estimate the true productivity of that rm. This is crucial since it directly biases

7 See Klette and Griliches (1996) and De Loecker (2009) for examples.
8 The constant-elasticity demand generates a revenue function that is strictly increasing in quantity.
Therefore, a given revenue implies a unique quantity.
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the relationship I am interested in examining in favor of the common nding that exporters
are more productive.

5.1

Model of Prices

In order to control for unobserved prices, I model domestic and foreign demand separately
using a standard approach in the trade literature. Within a given industry, rms are assumed
to produce horizontally dierentiated products and compete in a monopolistically competitive setting. Firms face symmetric constant-elasticity demand curves. There are separate
domestic and foreign markets.

9

The demand functions are given by the following equations:

D

PjtD = P t
where

Qt

 QD  η1
jt
D
Qt

E

PjtE = τ P t

;

 QE  η1
jt
E

Qt

(5)

,

is an aggregate demand shifter related to industry demand at time

price deator,

Qjt

and
11

costs of exporting.
superscript

E

Pjt

are the rm-specic quantity and price, and

Superscript

D

τ

t,10 P t

is the

denotes marginal

denotes variables related to the domestic market, and

denotes variables related to the export market. The elasticity of demand,

assumed to be the same in both markets.

12

in nominal units of the domestic currency.

η , is

Both domestic and foreign prices are measured

13

In Section 7, I show how these demands are

used to control for unobserved prices when estimating productivity.

6 Controlling for Endogeneity Due to Unobserved Productivity
As stated earlier, the concern that inputs are endogenous due to their correlation with unobserved productivity has received a lot of attention in the industrial organization literature.
Several methods have been suggested for dealing with this endogeneity.

14

If instruments

9 This is the setting, for example, in Melitz (2003), with the exception that in that paper there are

N

symmetric foreign markets. For simplicity, I focus on one foreign market. The results of this paper can be
generalized to account for multiple foreign markets.

10 I form the quantity index as a weighted-average of deated revenues, where the weights are the market

shares.

11 This is the standard iceberg assumption that the marginal costs of exporting are proportional to the

value of output that is exported.

12 This assumption can also be relaxed to allow for the elasticity of demand in the domestic market to

dier from the elasticity of demand in the foreign market. It complicates the algebra and adds one more
parameter to estimate, but all of the results that I show in the paper still hold.

13 This implies that the foreign price deator also captures the exchange rate.
14 For a summary of these methods and their relative advantages and disadvantages, see Griliches and

Mairesse (1998).
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are available, then instrumental variables techniques are a natural solution. However, valid
instruments for the endogenous inputs, such as input prices, are not typically available. Another approach is to use panel data techniques, but if productivity varies across both rms
and time, then it cannot be totally dierenced out as xed eects, and the remaining residual term is still correlated with inputs. In addition, panel data methods remove a lot of the
variation in the data, which is needed to identify the parameters of the model.
This leaves the recently-developed proxy variable methods of Olley and Pakes (1996),
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), and Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2006).
my setting, these methods cannot be employed either.

15

However, for

The reason, as I discuss below, is

that they cannot generally be used to estimate gross output specications of the production
function.

This is due to a problem with the identication of coecients related to static

and competitive inputs that occurs with this approach. This is particularly important given
both the empirical evidence in Section 4 regarding the use of value-added versus gross output
specications, and the fact that I need to model demand (for gross output) to control for
unobserved prices.
To illustrate, I briey describe the proxy variable approach.
methods is that the rm's demand for a proxy variable

λjt

The key insight of these

(either investment in physical

capital or intermediate input demand) is a monotonic function of the state variables of the
rm, productivity

ωjt

and capital

kjt :16
λjt = gt (ωjt , kjt ) .

Since this relationship is a strictly monotonic function of just one unobservable, it can be
inverted to express the unobserved productivity in terms of observable variables,

ωjt = gt−1 (λjt , kjt ) .
This expression for productivity then replaces productivity in the production function. Temporarily ignoring unobserved prices, log quantity can be expressed as follows:

yjt = qjt + εjt = ln (F (Kjt , Ljt , Mjt )) + gt−1 (λjt , kjt ) + εjt ,
where

qjt

denotes anticipated output in quantities and

yjt

denotes observed output that

is subject to ex-post productivity shocks and/or measurement error,

εjt .

This equation no

15 An alternative to estimating productivity is to recover TFP using an index number approach. These
techniques do not suer from endogeneity concerns as they do not involve running a regression. However,
they impose several potentially strong assumptions in order to recover TFP, such as constant returns to scale
and perfect competition in the input and output markets.

16 In Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2006), labor is also assumed to be a state variable.
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longer suers from endogeneity as
it separates

εjt

from

ωjt ,

as

ωjt

εjt

is assumed to be uncorrelated with inputs. In addition,

does not appear on the right-hand side.

The model also assumes that productivity evolves according to a rst-order Markov
process,

ωjt = ht (ωjt−1 ) + ξjt .
The innovations to productivity,
determined before

ξjt is realized.

ξjt ,

(6)

are assumed to be independent of all inputs that are

Then, for a given vector of the parameters of the production

function and the inverted proxy equation


gt−1 (•) ,

productivity can be formed, and the

regression in equation (6) can be computed. The residual of this regression is then interacted
with moments to estimate the parameters.
The problem with these methods, as recently pointed out in Bond and Söderbom (2005)
and Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2006), is that they cannot generally be used to identify
the coecients on static and competitive inputs. The reason is that there is nothing in the
model that varies these inputs (e.g., intermediate inputs) separately from productivity and
the other inputs.

17

As a result, a value-added specication, where intermediate inputs are

subtracted out and then ignored, has to be used when employing these methods.

6.1

The Share Equation Approach

Since a gross output production function is required for the problem at hand, I need a
method that can estimate gross output models. Since none of the methods in the literature
can be applied to the problem I study, I apply a new method for estimating production
functions from Gandhi, Navarro, and Rivers (2009) (henceforth GNR). This method controls
for endogeneity due to unobserved productivity in a gross output setting. I generalize the
approach developed in GNR to a setting of imperfect competition in which there are both
domestic and foreign markets. I also show how this method can be extended to deal with
the complications due to the presence of unobserved prices when some rms are exporting.
The key insight of GNR is that there is important unused information contained in the

17 Under some specic assumptions on the data generating process, the proxy variable method can be
used when investment is the proxy variable. However, using investment as the proxy requires dropping all
observations for which there is zero investment in physical capital. This can lead to a signicant loss of data,
as pointed out by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). In my dataset, this would result in a loss of 40% of the
observations.
In addition to the loss of data, the use of these methods would require the existence of a specic source
of variation in demand for intermediate inputs. In particular, this source of variation would have to either
have no dynamic eects, or would have to be observable.

If the source of variation was unobserved and

had dynamic eects, then this would invalidate the necessary assumption that productivity is the only
unobservable that aects investment decisions.
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rm's input shares. The shares not only provide identifying information for the parameters
18

of the production function but also allow for richer forms of rm-level heterogeneity.

To

keep the analysis straightforward, I rst illustrate the method under the assumption that
rms are perfectly competitive in the output market, which is the setting typically analyzed
in the literature on production function estimation.
For a generic production technology, consider a rm's maximization problem with respect
to a static and competitive input, such as intermediate inputs,

Mjt :

max Pjt Qjt − PtM Mjt = max Pjt F (Kjt , Ljt , Mjt ) eωjt − PtM Mjt .
Mjt

Mjt

This results in the following rst-order condition:

Pjt FM (Kjt , Ljt , Mjt ) eωjt − PtM = 0,
where

FM (•) denotes the partial derivative of F (•) with respect to intermediate inputs, M .

Notice that the rst-order condition contains both unobserved output prices and unobserved
productivity.

These are the two sources of endogeneity that are causing problems in the

estimation to begin with. However, this expression can be re-arranged in terms of the share
of intermediate inputs in total revenue:

FM (Kjt , Ljt , Mjt ) × Mjt
PtM Mjt
=
.
Pjt Qjt
F (Kjt , Ljt , Mjt )

(7)

As equation (7) shows, the shares of intermediate inputs can be expressed in terms of the production function, the rst derivative of the production function with respect to intermediate
inputs, and the level of intermediate inputs.
Taking logs, replacing the product of price and quantity with revenue, and accounting
for ex-post productivity shocks and measurement error yields what GNR calls the share
equation:


sjt ≡ ln
where

Rjt

PtM Mjt
Rjt


= ln (FM (Kjt , Ljt , Mjt )) − ln (F (Kjt , Ljt , Mjt )) + mjt − εjt ,

denotes observed revenues. This equation separates

εjt

from

ωjt

(note that

(8)

ωjt ,

which appeared in the rst-order condition, is now contained in the left-hand side term) and

18 See Gandhi, Navarro, and Rivers (2009) for a discussion of the benets of being able to allow for other
forms of unobserved heterogeneity (in addition to productivity).
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collapses unobserved prices within observed revenues. Furthermore, it provides an additional
source of identifying information for the production function directly through the rst term:
the derivative of the production function with respect to intermediate inputs.

The share

equation together with the production function can be used to express the two unobservables,

εjt

and

ωjt ,

19

as a function of the parameters of the production function:


sjt ≡ ln


PtM Mjt
= ln (FM (Kjt , Ljt , Mjt )) − ln (F (Kjt , Ljt , Mjt )) + mjt − εjt
Rjt
yjt = ln (F (Kjt , Ljt , Mjt )) + ωjt + εjt

The same assumption made in the proxy variable methodsthat productivity evolves in
a Markovian fashioncan be used to form estimates of the innovation to productivity,

ξjt can
productivity (ωjt ).

Moments with both
hence rm-level

6.1.1

εjt

and

ξjt .

then be formed to recover the production function and

Imperfect Competition

The approach developed in GNR generalizes well to other specications of the underlying
model and can be used under various data restrictions (e.g., observing only revenues as
opposed to quantities).

In particular, it can handle imperfect competition.

When rms

charge constant markups, which is the case with the constant elasticity of demand curves I
introduced in Section 5.1, the share equation remains the same, with the exception of one
20

additional term, which is the log of the markup:


sjt ≡ ln

PtM Mjt
Rjt




= ln (FM (Kjt , Ljt , Mjt )) − ln (F (Kjt , Ljt , Mjt )) + mjt − ln


η
− εjt .
η+1
(9)

Moreover, the share equation is the same for both exporting and non-exporting rms.

21

These results highlight an appealing feature of the approach in GNR: relaxing assumptions
within this framework results in equations that are still easy to use.

19 Note that equation (8) could be estimated directly and non-parametrically without specifying a functional
form for the production function.

The right-hand side of the equation is just a function of the inputs to

production and measurement error, which is uncorrelated with inputs.

20 With the constant-elasticity demand system, the markup that rms optimally charge is

η



η
η+1



, where

is the elasticity of demand.

21 The fact that the share equation does not depend on export status is a result of the assumption that the

domestic and foreign demand elasticities are the same. When this assumption is relaxed, the share equation
for exporters becomes a slightly more complicated function that includes an extra parameterthe foreign
demand elasticitybut the intuition and results of the model still hold.

14

Thus far I have shown how the share equation can be used to control for the endogeneity
due to unobserved productivity. I have also shown how the share equation can be modied
to account for both imperfect competition and exporting.

The remaining step is to use

the model of demand from Section 5.1 to control for unobserved prices in the production
function.

7 The Empirical Model: Revenues and Exporting
In this section, I assemble all of the pieces: the demand systems to control for unobserved
prices, the share equation to control for endogeneity of inputs due to unobserved productivity,
and the gross output specication. I begin by showing that the revenue production function
needs to be adjusted to account for the dierent sources of revenues. I then show how to
solve the problem that this createsby pairing the demand systems introduced in Section
5.1 with the rm's optimal allocation of output across the domestic and foreign markets.
This leads to what I call the domestic revenue production function, which paired with the
share equation, constitutes my empirical model.
As I discussed in Section 5, when some rms export, their revenues come from both
domestic and foreign markets, each with their own demands. Total revenues for exporting
rms are then the sum of domestic and foreign revenues. By replacing the prices using the
demand systems in Section 5.1, total revenues can be expressed as follows:

D
E
E E
Rjt = Rjt
+ Rjt
= PjtD QD
jt + Pjt Qjt

D

= 

Pt

1
D η
Qt

1+ η1
QD
jt

E

+τ

Pt

QE
1
jt

E η
Qt

1+ η1

.

Two main problems with this expression prevent it from being used directly. First, marginal
costs of exporting,

τ,

are not observed. Second, there is no model for the quantity of output

sold on the domestic market,

QD
jt ,

separate from the quantity of output sold on the foreign

E
market, Qjt . There is only a model for total quantity: the production function. In order to
address these challenges, I derive a model for the
from the

foreign

revenues.

domestic

revenues of the rms separately

In doing so, I am able to estimate the elasticity of demand

and all of the parameters of the production function, including unobserved productivity.
I accomplish this by taking advantage of another static rst-order condition of the rm.
Specically, I look at the rm's maximization problem with respect to its allocation of
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output between the domestic and foreign markets.
I dene the fraction of a rm's physical output that is sold on the domestic market as

θjt =

QD
jt
.
QD
+
QE
jt
jt

As I show in Appendix A, when the elasticities of demand are the same in both markets,
rms choose to allocate output such that the prices received by the rm in both markets are
equal. Since the prices are equal, this implies that the division of quantities across markets,

is not observed in the data, is equal to the division of revenues across markets, which
is observed in the data.22 As a result, I can derive an expression for domestic quantity as a
which

function of the division of revenues and the production function,

QD
jt = θjt × Qjt =

D
Rjt
D
E
Rjt
+ Rjt

!
× F (Kjt , Ljt , Mjt ) × eωjt .

By using the domestic demand curve, I can obtain a model for the observed measure of
domestic output (i.e., domestic revenues).

The log of deated domestic revenues,

D
rejt
,

is

given by the following equation:



1
D
rejt = 1 +
ln
η

D
Rjt
D
E
Rjt
+ Rjt

!



1
1 D
− qt + 1 +
[ln (F (Kjt , Ljt , Mjt )) + ωjt ] + εjt .
η
η

This equation controls for unobserved prices when some rms are exporting. Additionally,
when combined with the share equation, it controls for endogeneity due to unobserved productivity, all within a gross output setting.
Putting the two equations together yields the set of estimating equations:

ln (FM (Kjt , Ljt , Mjt )) − ln (F (Kjt , Ljt , Mjt )) + mjt − ln

sjt =



η
η+1



− εjt
(10)

D
rejt
=



1+

1
η



ln



D
Rjt
D +RE
Rjt
jt



−

1 D
q
η t



+ 1+

1
η



[ln (F (Kjt , Ljt , Mjt )) + ωjt ] + εjt .

Note that the share in the rst equation is a function of nominal total revenues, and the
dependent variable of the second equation is deated domestic revenues.

22 When the elasticities of demand in the domestic and foreign markets are not the same, the ratio of prices
is equal to the ratio of the markups.
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7.1

Learning-by-Exporting

As discussed in Section 2, some papers in the trade literature suggest that exporting leads
to an increase in a rm's productivity. If this is the case, then the process governing the
evolution of productivity is now a controlled Markov process, as a rm's decision about
whether or not to export has an eect on its realization of productivity. This needs to be
taken into account in the estimation strategy.
export status,

Djt−1 ,

be written as follows:

Under the timing assumption that lagged

aects the realization of productivity, the process for productivity can
23

ωjt = h̃ (ωjt−1 , Djt−1 ) + ξjt .

(11)

Testing for the presence of learning-by-exporting is therefore embedded directly into the
estimation procedure.

8 Data and Estimation Results
8.1

Data

My data come from an annual census of Colombian manufacturing plants over the period
1981-1991. The data cover all rms with 10 or more employees. This dataset has been used
previously in several studies (for example, Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Clerides, Lach,
and Tybout (1998)) and contains information about each plant's capital stocks, investment
ows, expenditures on labor and intermediate inputs, number of workers, wages, value of
total output, and value of output that is exported.
For the structural estimates I focus on the largest 3-digit industry, which is Apparel (industry 322). Since I model rms as being monopolistically competitive, I need an industry
that contains a large number of rms for this assumption to be valid. Additionally, choosing
the largest industry yields the most observations for the estimation. After dropping observations with missing values, a total of 4,490 observations remain for 732 rms, of which 18%
exported in at least one year. In Table 3, I report some summary statistics for the data.

8.2

Parametrization

So far, my discussion of the method of GNR that I employ has not relied on any functional
form assumptions on the production function. In my estimation, I use a CES specication

23 In the estimation procedure I assume that

h̃ (ωjt−1 , Djt−1 ) is linear and additively separable in its
ω and D. The only key assumption here is separability.

arguments. I can allow for more general functions of
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of the production function. The parametric versions of the share equation and the domestic
revenue production function for CES are:

sjt ≡ ln



PtM Mjt
Rjt

 

ρ
η
+ ρmjt − εjt
= − ln αl Lρjt + αk Kjt
+ αm Mjtρ + ln (αm r) − ln η+1

  RD  


ρ
jt
= 1 + η1 ln RD +R
+ 1 + η1 ρr ln αl Lρjt + αk Kjt
+ αm Mjtρ
E
jt
jt


1
+ 1 + η ωjt − η1 q D
t + εjt ,



D
r̃jt

(12)
where

αl , αk

and

αm

of substitution), and

8.3

are share parameters,

r

ρ

is the CES parameter (



1
1−ρ



is the elasticity

is returns to scale.

Parameters of the Revenue Production Function

As a rst step, I estimate a baseline version of the model under the assumption that rms
are perfectly competitive. In this setting, all price variation is captured by the time-varying
price index, so unobserved prices are perfectly controlled for by the price index. As a result,
only endogeneity due to unobserved productivity needs to be controlled for. To do this, I
implement a version of the share equation method under perfect competition. The estimating
equations in this setting are:

sjt ≡ ln



PtM Mjt
Rjt



yjt
where

yjt


ρ
= − ln αl Lρjt + αk Kjt
+ αm Mjtρ + ln (αm r) + ρmjt − εjt

 
ρ
+ αm Mjtρ + 1 + η1 ωjt + εjt ,
= ρr ln αl Lρjt + αk Kjt

(13)

is total deated revenues. The results for the baseline model are presented in Table

4.
The coecients on each of the inputs in the production function

(αl , αk , αm )

are not

robust to dierences in the scaling of inputs. As a result, I report mean input elasticities
24

with respect to each of the inputs, as opposed to the parameter estimates themselves.
25

Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the parameter estimates.

The results for the baseline model are reasonable. Output is most elastic with respect
to intermediate inputs, and the labor elasticity is about twice that of capital.

The CES

24 In fact, the sum of these three parameters is not separately identied from the mean of productivity.
Because of this, I normalize the sum of the three parameters to be one, and dene

αm = 1 − αl − αk .

25 Standard errors for the share parameters (not shown), returns to scale, and the CES parameter are

based on the asymptotic distribution. For the input elasticities and the elasticity of demand, standard errors
are computed by sampling 5,000 sets of parameters from their asymptotic distribution, constructing these
elasticities, and computing the standard deviation of the resulting elasticities.
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parameter suggests an elasticity of substitution that is larger than for Cobb-Douglas. The
results also suggest that the technology exhibits constant returns to scale.

There is no

estimate for the elasticity of demand or markups since rms are assumed to be perfectly
competitive.

These results are in line with typical production function estimates in the

literature, which nd roughly constant returns to scale and labor elasticities that are about
twice as large as capital elasticities.
In Table 4, I present the estimates of the full model (equation (12)) where I account for all
of the potential sources of bias. The estimates for the full model do not dier much in terms
of the input elasticities or the CES parameter. The biggest dierence is in the estimates of
returns to scale and market power.
26

markups of about 11%.

I nd moderate increasing returns to scale as well as

These results are consistent with other papers in the literature

that address the omitted price bias (e.g., Klette and Griliches (1996), Gandhi, Navarro,
and Rivers (2009), and De Loecker (2009)).

In addition these results are consistent with

the recent trade theory in which rms face downward-sloping demand curves and exhibit
increasing returns to scale.

8.4

Learning-by-Exporting

As I discussed in Section 7.1, I can directly test for evidence of learning-by-exporting by
explicitly allowing the evolution of productivity to depend on lagged export status. I use
the following specication for the process on productivity in the estimation:

ωjt = δ0 + δ1 ωjt−1 + δ2 Djt−1 + ξjt ,
where the estimate of

δ2

denotes the percentage increase in productivity due to exporting in

the previous period. The point estimate for

δ2

is -0.4% and is not statistically dierent from

zero, which implies a lack of evidence for learning in the data. This result is not surprising
given, as I show next, that I nd no correlation between exporting and productivity.

8.5

Productivity Comparison

Given the parameter estimates from the full model, which corrects for the transmission bias,
the omitted price bias with exporting, and the bias from using a value-added rather than
a gross output specication, I can recover an unbiased estimate of total factor productivity

26 It is not surprising that I nd increasing returns to scale given that I nd evidence of market power.
The baseline model, which ignores unobserved prices, nds constant returns to scale. That means that if a
rm doubles it inputs, it doubles its output, which is measured as deated revenues. However, if that rm
has market power, then as it increases its output, its price decreases. Therefore, in order for a doubling of
inputs to lead to a doubling of revenues, there must be increasing returns to scale in production.
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for each rm. These estimates identify dierences in eciency across rms separately from
dierences in input levels or size. Using these estimates, I compute the productivity premia
for exporters.

I dene a rm to be an exporter in each year in which the rm exports a

positive amount, and a non-exporter in all other years. I nd that exporters are not more
productive than non-exporters.

I present this result in Table 5.

For comparison, I also

report the productivity premia for the Apparel industry (322) that were derived from the
two common measures of productivity in the empirical trade literature: labor productivity
and TFP measured as the residual from a OLS regression of log value added on log inputs.
(These results were originally reported in Table 1.) Standard errors for the estimated premia
are reported in parentheses below the point estimates.

27

The point estimate from the full model suggests that exporters are 1% less productive
than non-exporters, although the estimate is not statistically dierent from zero. This result
diers sharply from the productivity premia obtained by measuring productivity as labor
productivity or as the residual from an OLS regression of value added on inputs, which imply
large statistically signicant productivity advantages for exporters.
Since one might be concerned that these results, which compare mean productivity across
export status, are driven by outliers and are not representative of the entire distribution, I
also report the distributions of productivity by export status. These are reported in Figure
2. Although there is more variation in productivity for exporters, the distributions look very
similar, which suggests that there are no systematic dierences between exporting rms and
non-exporting rms in terms of productivity.

8.6

Implications for Models of Exporting

Once unbiased estimates of total factor productivity are obtained, exporters no longer appear
to be more productive than non-exporters. This suggests that dierences in technological
eciency are not the primary determinant of export status. This begs the question that, if
productivity dierences do not explain heterogeneous exporting decisions, then what does?
One possibility is dierences in capital stock. As shown in Figure 3, exporters are on average
much larger, in terms of capital, than non-exporters.
This is consistent with the basic mechanism in Melitz's model as he does not include
capital in the model. If capital is not perfectly exible, then persistent dierences in capital

27 For the productivity premia based on labor productivity and TFP from a value-added OLS specication,
standard errors are computed via the non-parametric bootstrap. For the productivity premium based on
TFP estimates from the full model using gross output, standard errors are computed by sampling 5,000
sets of parameters from their asymptotic distribution, computing rm-level productivity, computing the
productivity premium for exporters, and then calculating the standard deviation of the resulting premia
over the 5,000 samples.
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Figure 2: Distribution of TFP by Export Status

stocks will operate like dierences in productivity and generate the same type of selection
into exporting, with the selection being on capital, rather than productivity. However, as
Figure 3 illustrates, dierences in capital are not sucient to explain exporting decisions, as
there are many large rms that do not export, and some small rms that do. This suggests
that some other form of rm-level heterogeneity must be important in determining exporting
decisions.
One benet of the model that I have derived is that it contains additional information
that suggests the potential sources of this heterogeneity.

In Section 7, I showed how the

model can be used to compute the share of total output that is sold on the domestic market,

θjt .

In Figure 4, I present a histogram of export intensity (the percentage of output sold on

the foreign market),

1 − θjt

, conditional on a rm being an exporter. The gure is for the

Apparel industry, but similar patterns hold in other industries.
As Figure 4 illustrates, there is a lot of heterogeneity in export intensity. This heterogeneity cannot be explained by dierences in either productivity or capital stocks. Export
intensity is only a function of the relative marginal revenues of the markets.

Recall the

demand equations from Section 5.1:

PjtD

=

D
Pt

 QD  η1
jt
D
Qt

;

PjtE

=

E
τPt

 QE  η1
jt
E

Qt

.

As I show in Appendix A, prot maximization implies setting the marginal revenues equal
to each other. This in turn implies that the optimal fraction of quantity sold on the domestic
market,

∗
θjt
,

is given by the following equation:

21

Figure 3: Capital Stock by Export Status

Eη

τ P tE
Qt

∗
θjt
=

τ

Eη
Pt
E
Qt

Dη

+

Pt

,

(14)

D
Qt

which is just a function of the relative price and quantity indices and the marginal exporting
costs.
So far I have presented the marginal costs of exporting and the foreign price and quantity
indices as varying across time but not across rm. However, none of my results have relied
on this assumption. Rather, this was for clarity in the exposition. If dierent rms export
to dierent countries and face dierent transportation costs, then these terms capturing the
marginal costs and marginal benets of exporting will be heterogeneous across rms as well.
All of this heterogeneity can be expressed by an index,

E

P jt
πjt ≡ τjt ×   1 ,
E η
Qjt
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Figure 4: Export Intensity

where the terms on the right hand side are allowed to vary by rm.
By looking at the counterpart to the domestic revenue production function, we can see
how this heterogeneity enters the model. Foreign revenues are given by the following equation:

E
rjt



1
+ 1 + η ln (1 − θjt )

= ln τjt ×  E  1
η
 Qjt  h
i

ρ
+ 1 + η1 ρr ln αl Lρjt + αk Kjt
+ αm Mjtρ + ωjt + εjt .

By substituting in

E
rjt

!

E
P jt

πjt ,

(15)

equation (15) can be written as a function of this heterogeneity,



1
η



= ln (πjt ) + 1 +
ln (1 − θjt )

h
i

ρ
+ 1 + η1 ρr ln αl Lρjt + αk Kjt
+ αm Mjtρ + ωjt + εjt .

I can now obtain an estimate of

πjt

(16)

directly from equation (16). Note that I already have

estimates of all of the other parameters of equation (16) from the estimation of the domestic
revenue production function. I also have an estimate of TFP
ductivity/measurement error term
export-related heterogeneity,

(εjt ).

(ωjt )

and of the ex-post pro-

In Figure 5, I plot this measure of the underlying

πjt .

Not surprisingly, there is a lot of heterogeneity in

πjt .

In addition, I nd that

πjt

is highly

persistent over time, with an average correlation coecient of 0.85. This persistence suggests
that this underlying heterogeneity is not random noise but rather evidence of persistent
dierences across rms that aect exporting decisions.
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In particular, this suggests that

Figure 5: Export-Related Heterogeneity

dierences in the geography of trade (through dierences in destination and marginal costs
of exporting) are important determinants of rm-level exporting decisions.

9 Conclusion
In this paper, I examine the empirical nding that exporting rms are more productive than
non-exporting rms. I replicate this stylized fact on data for Colombian manufacturing rms
using two commonly used measures of productivity from the trade literature.

However, I

show that these commonly used productivity measures are potentially biased due to both
the use of value-added specications of the production function and endogeneity caused by
productivity and prices being unobserved and unaccounted for.

I nd evidence that the

measures of productivity used in the literature over-estimate the productivity advantage of
exporting rms. By extending a new strategy for estimating production functions, I am able
to control for unobserved productivity and unobserved prices within a gross output setting.
There are two key ndings in this paper. First, I nd that once unbiased productivity
estimates are obtained, exporting rms no longer appear more productive than non-exporting
rms. In fact, the distributions of productivity across export status are very similar. This
suggests that productivity is not the main determinant of exporting decisions. Consequently,
some other form of rm-level heterogeneity is driving exporting decisions. Second, using data
on export intensity, I show that heterogeneity associated with dierences in the geographic
barriers faced by rms can explain exporting decisions. While the rst nding alone does

24

not refute that xed costs of exporting are a determinant of export status, it does show
that they may not be as important as commonly believed. Furthermore, the second nding
suggests that a model of exporting that ignores other sources of heterogeneity will miss key
facts in the data. Together, these two results suggest that future research should emphasize
the role that geography plays in determining patterns in rm-level exporting decisions.
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Table 1: Export Productivity PremiaColombia
Measure \ Industry

311

312

313

314

321

322

323

324

331

332

Labor ProductivityVA

655%

118%

183%

151%

46%

43%

20%

27%

57%

11%

TFPVA

368%

15%

114%

-17%

-3%

17%

-5%

24%

36%

25%

Measure \ Industry

341

342

351

352

353

354

355

356

361

362

Labor ProductivityVA

89%

96%

46%

88%

-37%

379%

80%

71%

300%

124%

TFPVA

-3%

43%

20%

27%

1%

127%

-5%

14%

4%

6%

Measure \ Industry

369

371

372

381

382

383

384

385

390

Mean

Labor ProductivityVA

95%

196%

113%

85%

38%

88%

77%

73%

46%

116%

TFPVA

20%

6%

49%

16%

10%

14%

21%

5%

20%

33%

Firms are classied by industry according to the ISIC Rev. 2 classication.
Labor ProductivityVA is based on estimates of labor productivity computed as real value-added per worker. TFPVA is
based on estimates of TFP computed as the residual from a regression of log real value-added on log capital and log labor.
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Table 2: Export Productivity PremiaColombia
Measure \ Industry

311

312

313

314

321

322

323

324

331

332

Labor ProductivityVA

655%

118%

183%

151%

46%

43%

20%

27%

57%

11%

TFPVA

368%

15%

114%

-17%

-3%

17%

-5%

24%

36%

25%

TFPGO

23%

0%

52%

0%

1%

3%

-4%

2%

14%

4%

Measure \ Industry

341

342

351

352

353

354

355

356

361

362

Labor ProductivityVA

89%

96%

46%

88%

-37%

379%

80%

71%

300%

124%

TFPVA

-3%

43%

20%

27%

1%

127%

-5%

14%

4%

6%

TFPGO

2%

9%

-3%

2%

10%

4%

3%

4%

1%

-1%

Measure \ Industry

369

371

372

381

382

383

384

385

390

Mean

Labor ProductivityVA

95%

196%

113%

85%

38%

88%

77%

73%

46%

116%

TFPVA

20%

6%

49%

16%

10%

14%

21%

5%

20%

33%

TFPGO

5%

1%

9%

4%

-1%

4%

8%

1%

2%

5%

Firms are classied by industry according to the ISIC Rev. 2 classication.
Labor ProductivityVA is based on estimates of labor productivity computed as real value-added per worker. TFPVA is
based on estimates of TFP computed as the residual from a regression of log real value-added on log capital and log labor.
TFPGO is based on estimates of TFP computed as the residual from a regression of log real gross output on log capital, log
labor, and log intermediate inputs.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Colombian Apparel Firms
Standard
Mean

Deviation

Gross Output

49.2

148.7

Value Added

21.3

63.4

Capital Stock

10.3

35.7

Number of Workers

82.3

163.4

Wages

10.7

26.3

Value of Intermediate Input

27.9

88.1

9.8%

28.8%

41.7%

37.8%

Percentage of Output Exported
Percentage of Output Exported (Exporters Only)

All gures are reported in thousands of 1981 pesos, with the exception of percentage of output exported and
number of workers.
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Table 4: Production Function Parameter EstimatesApparel

Baseline Model
Full Model

Mean

Mean

Mean

L Elas.

K Elas.

M Elas.

r

ρ

η

Markup

0.30

0.15

0.53

0.99

0.79





(0.007)

(0.006)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.005)





0.29

0.20

0.59

1.08

0.82

-10.40

1.11

(0.27)

(0.07)

(27.34)

(0.33)

(0.08)
(0.09)
(0.18)
r : returns to scale
ρ : CES parameter (elasticity of substitution
η : elasticity of demand

=

1
)
1−ρ

Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the point estimates.
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Table 5: Export Productivity PremiaApparel
Productivity
Measure

Dierence

Labor ProductivityValue-Added

43%

(0.08)
TFPValue-AddedOLS

17%

(0.06)
TFPGross OutputFull Model

-1%

(0.13)
Labor ProductivityValue-Added is based on estimates of labor productivity computed as real value-added
per worker.

TFPValue-AddedOLS is based on estimates of TFP computed as the residual from a

regression of log real value-added on log capital and log labor. TFPGross OutputFull Model is based
on estimates of TFP computed as the residual from a regression of log real gross output on log capital, log
labor, and log intermediate inputs.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the point estimates.
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Appendix A: Optimal Allocation of Output
Conditional on a rm deciding to export, it must determine how to optimally allocate quantity to the domestic and foreign markets.

Since goods sold on the domestic and foreign

markets share the same production technology, their marginal costs are the same. Therefore, prot maximization implies that the rm wants to set the marginal revenue in the
domestic market equal to the marginal revenue in the foreign market. Given the demands
in equation (5), domestic marginal revenue can be derived as follows:

D
Rjt

PjtD QD
jt
  η1
1+ η1
D
1
Pt
QD
D
jt

=
=

Qt

⇒


D
M Rjt
=

1+

1
η



Pt

D





1+

1
η

=

1
D
Qt


 η1

QD
jt

 η1

PjtD .

Similarly, foreign marginal revenue is equal to:
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PjtE .

Consequently, setting the marginal revenues equal to each other implies setting the prices
equal to each other.

PjtD = PjtE
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Solving this expression for
on the domestic market,

⇒
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(1 − θjt )×Qjt , I obtain the following expression:
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yields the expression for the optimal fraction of quantity sold
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which is just a function of the transportation costs and the price and quantity indices in
both markets.
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